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STATEMENT SHOWING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COORT
AND THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to §78-2-2(3)(i) , Utah Code Annotated, and Rule 3(a), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

This appeal is from a final

order of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
Court in and for Uintah County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Dennis L. Draney presiding.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

When did the "legal malpractice11 occur, that is,

when the respondent first filed the U.C.C. 1 statement with
the Lieutenant Governor in 1976, or when he failed to refile
it or notify the appellant, his client, that he needed to
refile it in May, 1981?
2.

In "legal malpractice11 cases, when does the Statute

of Limitations commence to run?

Is it when the malpractice

was committed, May of 1981 when the U.C.C. 1 continuation
statement was not filed; and/or 1976 when the respondent
failed to secure the transaction with a mortgage or like
instrument on real property; or, when the damage occurred,
with the filing of the bankruptcy in 1983, or when the error
and omission was discovered after the filing of the bankruptcy?
3.

Are there questions of fact that need to be deter-

mined in order to apply the question of law as to when the
-1-

Statute of Limitations begin to run, or was it as a matter
of law, the date the respondent created the initial contract
in 1976?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case involves a claim for professional negligence
or legal malpractice resulting in the loss of security to
secure a debt.
dent's Motion

The trial court, in considering the responfor Summary

which the court concluded

Judgment, granted

judgment

in

the professional negligence or

legal malpractice, if it occurred, occurred in 1976 when the
respondent first created the contract, rather than in 1981
when the respondent failed to either renew a U.C.C. 1 statement or inform the appellant that he needed to renew it.
The trial court also refused to apply the discovery rule in
determining

when

the

running, but rather

Statute

concluded

of
the

Limitations
applicable

commenced
Statute of

Limitations commenced running when the respondent performed
the initial legal services that should have resulted in the
securing of the appellant's obligation, and thereby granted
Summary Judgment in reliance on the Statute of Limitations
issue in favor of the respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent had been appellant's attorney for many years.
-2-

Commencing in approximately 1965, he assisted the appellant
in setting up a recreational
County.

vehicle business

in Uintah

In 1975 he set up a corporation known as Merkley

Motors, Inc., and performed all necessary legal services to
effect the transfer of real and personal property into that
corporation.

(J. Ray Merkley deposition p. 8; John C.

Beaslin deposition Exhibit #1; and R. 22)
As of March, 1976, appellant and his then-wife owned
99% of the capital shares of Merkley Motors, Inc. (R. 23)
They were offered the sum of One Hundred Twenty Thousand
Dollars ($120,000.00) from certain relatives, collectively
referred to as the other Merkleys.
tion pp. 11-13)

(J. Ray Merkley deposi-

Because respondent had been appellant's

attorney for many years, and had assisted appellant in all
of his business matters in which he needed legal advice, and
had performed
business

and

all necessary
transfer

the

functions to incorporate the
appellant's

real

and

personal

property into the corporate structure, the appellant retained
the respondent as his attorney to appropriately prepare the
legal documents necessary to effectuate

the sale of the

capital shares of the corporation to the other Merkleys, and
at the same time, to have sufficient security available to
cover the sales price in the event of default on the part of
the

other

Merkleys

in

purchasing

the

capital

ownership

interest represented by the shares in the corporation.
-3-

The

respondent, as the appellant's attorney, undertook to represent the interests of the appellant

in the sale of the

capital shares of the corporation to the other Merkleys, and
agreed to draft the appropriate and necessary legal documents

to

effectuate

the

sale of

the

capital

shares of

Merkley Motors, Inc., which sale was to be secured by the
real property on which the business was located in Vernal,
Utah, and by an inventory that was unencumbered which would
be in excess of any balance owing to the appellant, the
seller.

Appellant advised respondent of what the agreement

between the buyers and the sellers was to be, namely, that
the

sale

price

of

One

Hundred

Twenty

Thousand

Dollars

($120,000.00), which represented the value of the inventory
and the net equity of the real property was to be structured
in such a way as to fully secure the appellant

for the

unpaid balance of the sale price by a security interest in
both

the

real

property

and

the

unencumbered

inventory.

Respondent agreed to represent the appellant, and prepared a
contract of sale.

(R. 23-30)

He also prepared a financing

statement (hereinafter referred to as a U.C.C. 1) which he
had filed on May 4, 1976, and in which he listed Merkley
Motors, Inc. as the debtor, and had Tal R. Merkley and
Charlene Merkley sign, and in which he listed the appellant
J. Ray Merkley, and his then-wife Janet Merkley, as the
secured parties.

(R. 31)

The respondent did not, contrary
-4-

to appellant's request, secure the real property asset of
the corporation by a mortgage or like instrument to the
appellant, but rather, in a very unworkable and loose document, merely provided for the escrow of corporate stock, but
did not secure the obligation owed by the buyers to the
appellant seller.
Even though

(R. 23-30 and R. 41-45)
the respondent

attempted

to

secure the

inventory and other personal assets of the corporation by
the U.C.C. 1 filing on May 4, 1976, he did not set up any
follow-up procedures for the renewal of that document on a
periodic basis

as reauired

by

the U.C.C,

nor

did

the

respondent inform the appellant that the document would have
to be renewed or refiled on a periodic basis in order to
retain its validity. (R. 14-16; J. Ray Merkley deposition
pp. 38-46)

Repondent continued to handle the legal matters

of the appellant as well as the buyers of Merkley Motors,
Inc.

in several subsequent transactions dealing with the

same asset through 1976, 1977, and 1978.
sition of John C. Beaslin)

(Exhibit #1, depo-

Respondent did not, however,

ever advise the appellant that he had not secured the sales
agreement by a mortgage or trust deed on the real property,
or that the U.C.C. 1 filing would need to be renewed or
refiled on a periodic basis in order to retain its validity.
(R. 14-16; J. Ray Merkley deposition pp. 38-46)

The respon-

dent did not renew the U.C.C. 1 filing in May, 1981, when it
-5-

had

to be renewed

to maintain

the security

interest on

behalf of the appellant, nor did the appellant know that he
was supposed

to file a renewal.

As a matter

of fact,

respondent's office staff tried to lead appellant to believe
that the U.C.C. 1 filings were good indefinately, and did
not need to be renewed.

(J. Pay Merkley deposition pp.

37-38)
Merkley Motors, Inc., through

its officers, who had

been the purchasers from the appellant, filed a bankruptcy
on behalf of Merkley Motors, Inc. in the early part of 1983,
approximately two years after the U.C.C. 1 filing should
have been renewed.

Because the U.C.C. 1 filing had not been

renewed, appellant lost his security interest in the inventory, which, at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy was
in excess of the money owed him by the buyers, and he,
accordingly, lost

the principal

sum of

$54,360.18, plus

interest.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in its determination of when the
error or omission occurred, it actually being in 1981, and
not in 1976, and also erred in its conclusion as to when the
Statute of Limitations commenced running in any event.
decision of the trial court should be reversed.
-6-

The

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ERROR OR OMISSION OF RESPONDENT DID NOT OCCUR UNTIL
MAY, 1981f WHEN RESPONDENT NEITHER RENEWED THE U.C.C. 1
FILING NOR INFORMED APPELLANT HE HAD TO RENEW THE U.C.C. 1
FILING.
The trial court, in its ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, used the contract creation date of March 1,
1976 as the date on which the Statute of Limitations commenced rather than a period five years later, which is the
time the error actually occurred.
Section 70A-9-403, UCA, sets the effective periods for
U.C.C. 1 filings.

Subsections (2) and (3) provide:

11

(2) Except as provided in subsection (b)
a filed financing statement is effective
for a period of five years from the date of
filing. The effectiveness of a filed financing statement lapses on the expiration
of the five year period unless a continuation statement is filed prior to the lapse.
If a security interest perfected by filing
exists at the time insolvency proceedings
are commenced by or against the debtor, the
security interest remains perfected until
terminaton of the insolvency proceedings and
thereafter for a period of 60 days or until
expiration of the five year period, whichever occurs later. Upon lapse the security
interest becomes unperfected, unless it is
perfected without filing. If the security
interest becomes unperfected upon lapse, it
is deemed to have been unperfected as against
a person who became a purchaser or lien
creditor before lapse.
(3) A continuation statement may be filed
by the secured party within six months prior
-7-

to the expiration of the five year period
specified in subsection (2). Any such
continuation statement must be signed by
the secured party, identify the original
statement by file number or by entry
numbers and book and page numbers and
state that the original statement is
still effective. A continuation statement signed by a person other than the
secured party of record must be accompanied by a separate written statement of
assignment signed by the secured party of
record and complying with subsection (2)
of section 70A-9-405, including payment of
the required fee. Upon timely filing of
the continuation statement, the effectiveness of the original statement is continued for five years after the last date to
which the filing was effective whereupon
it lapses in the same manner as provided
in subsection (2) unless another continuation statement is filed prior to such
lapse. Succeeding continuation statements
may be filed in the same manner to continue the effectiveness of the original
statement. Unless a statute on disposition of public records provides otherwise,
the filing officer may remove a lapsed
statement from the files and destroy it
immediately if he has retained a microfilm or other photographic record, or
in other cases after one year after the
lapse. The filing officer shall so
arrange matters by physical annexation
of financing statements to continuation
statement or other related filings, or
by other means, that if he physically
destroys the financing statements of a
period more than five years past, those
which have been continued by a continuation
statement or which are still effective under
subsection (6) shall be retained.,f
Had the contract purchaser filed a bankruptcy any time
prior to May 4, 1981, the appellant would have been secured
under the U.C.C. 1 filing.

The error and omission of the

respondent was in not renewing or refiling
-8-

the U.C.C. 1

prior to May 4, 1981, or advising the appellant that he
would have to renew or refile the U.C.C. 1.
applied

the

Four

Year

Contract

Statute

The trial court
of

Limitations,

§78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated (1953), however, applied it
from the 1976 time mark and not the 1981 time mark.

The

appellant filed his complaint in July, 1984, a period well
within four years from the respondent's failure to renew the
U.C.C. 1 filing in May, 1981.
To follow the application by the trial court of the
Statute of Limitations beginning to run in 1976 rather than
in 1981, you achieve a result of having the Statute of Limitations expire one year before the error in not renewing the
U.C.C. 1 filing occurred.

The trial court plainly used the

incorrect date as the starting point by taking the date of
the original contract rather than the date five years later
when the security for the benefit of the appellant was lost
by the respondent's failure to act.
This court recently held in Brigham Young University v.
aulsen Construction Company, et al., 68 UAR 5 (Utah 1987):
"The general rule is that a cause of
action accrues upon 'the happening of
the last event necessary to . . . the
cause of action.1" [Citing Becton
Dickenson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254,
1257 (Utah 1983)
In this case the last event necessary to the cause of
action was the failure to file the continuation statement
for the U.C.C. 1 in May, 1981.
-9-

POINT II
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT COMMENCE

TO RON

UNTIL PLAINTIFF DISCOVERED, OR IN THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE
CARE SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERED, THE WRONG COMPLAINED OF, AND
THE INSTANT LAWSUIT WAS, THEREFORE, TIMELY,
If the court agrees with the appellant's first point,
it is really not essential to discuss this point as to the
loss of

the

security

interest

in the personal

property

covered by the U.C.C. 1 filing, however, the court may,
nonetheless, want to consider

this point relative to the

respondent's failure to secure the obligation created by the
sales contract by an appropriate mortgage or trust deed.
While this point should not affect the running of the time
for the error and omission in not renewing the U.C.C. 1
filing, it is worthy of consideration relative to the loss
of the security in the real estate because that error and
omission occurred in 1976.

It was not, however, discovered

until some time later, nor did the damage result until some
time later.
The time when the Statute of Limitations commences to
run has, for many years, been evolving into a rule of reason.

In legal malpractice cases, various state courts have

adopted rules of reason in determining when the Statute of
Limitations commences to run.

Two different

rules have

evolved, namely, the Damage Rule and the Discovery Rule.
-10-

To

be considered under either rule is the fact of the fiduciary
relationship that exists between an attorney and a client.
This court has recognized

that

trust and

confidence are

basic to the attorney/client relationship.

See Smoot v.

Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962); Omega Inv. Co. v.
Woolley, 72 Utah 474, 271 P. 797 (1928).

Because of the

fiduciary nature of the attorney/client relationship, the
courts that have considered the question of when the Statute
of Limitations commences to run have adopted one of two
rules, both of which bring you to the same point.

The one

rule is known as the Damage Rule, and simply stated, is that
there must be actual
accrues.

injury before the cause of action

The other is the Discovery Rule, which is that the

Statute of Limitations does not begin

to run until the

injured party discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable
care should discover, that there is a wrong to be complained
of.
The Damage Rule has grown

from a 1967 District of

Columbia decision of Fort Meyers Seafood Packers, Inc. v.
Steptoe

&

Johnson,

381

F.2d

261

(DC

Cir.

1967) which

involved a three-year occurrence limitation.

On May 16,

1962, the attorneys prepared a contract for providing that a
present American registry of the boats would be maintained.
On July 25, 1962, the boats arrived in Venezuala and were
impounded because their entry under American registry was
-11-

illegal.

Suit was not filed until July 22, 1965, more than

three years after the negligent advice was given, but less
than three years since the seizure of the boats.

The United

States Court

of use in

various

of Appeals noted

jurisdictions

the divergence

concerning

whether

negligence

or

injury initiated the start of the statutory period.

The

District

the

Court

had

chosen

the Occurrence

Rule, but

Appellate Court said:
"We see no good reason for drawing such
a distinction between malpractice suits
and other negligence actions. The impounding of the boats might have been found to
be an injury that resulted from Appellees1
legal advice. Since the suit was filed
within three years, we think it was timely.11
Since the Fort Meyers Seafood Packers decision, the
Damage Rule has been adopted by court decision in Arizona,
California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas,

and

Wisconsin.

See

Mallen

&

Levit,

Legal

Malpractice, Second Edition, §390, Note 11 (1981).
While the Utah court has not yet been called upon to
rule on the question of when the Statute of Limitations
begins to run in a legal malpractice case, this court has
ruled in recent years, under similar circumstances involving
a fiduciary relationship, that the Statute of Limitations
does not begin to run until the injured party discovers, or
-12-

in the exercise of reasonable care should discover, that
there was a wrong to be complained of.

It is really immate-

rial whether you apply the Damage Rule or the Discovery
Rule, under the facts of this case, because the time which
the Statute would begin to run is the same.

This court, in

Stewart v. K & S Company, Inc., 591 P.2d 433 (Utah 1979),
was called upon to determine when the Statute of Limitations
commenced running against a stockholder who brought a lawsuit against corporate officers.

The question was whether

you should apply an Occurrence Rule, which was applied by
the trial court in this case, and which would have barred
the plaintiff's claim by the three year Statute of Limitations.

In opting not to apply the Occurrence Rule, this

court stated:
"In addressing this issue, this principle
is to be borne in mind: where there is a
fiduciary relationship, such as between
corporate officers and a stockholder, the
Statute of Limitations does not begin to
run until the stockholder discovers, or
in the exercise of reasonable care should
discover, that there is a wrong to be
complained of; and it hardly needs to be
stated that this rule has application
where funds are wrongfully withheld from
stockholders."
While this case is dealing with a different statute
than was being dealt with in the Stewart case, the principle
is essentially the same because of the fiduciary relationship that exists between the attorney and his client, which

is probably of a higher quality, and in which there is more
trust

and

confidence

reposed

than

that

of

a

corporate

officer toward a stockholder.
Whether

you apply the Damage Rule or

the Discovery

Rule, the evidence in this case is clear that the appellant
did not discover, and would have no reason to be on inquiry
to make a discovery of the respondent's legal malpractice
until he attempted to enforce his security interest after
his obligor fs bankruptcy was filed.

Until that time pay-

ments were made by the contract buyers, and there was no
reason for him to make an independent determination, based
upon the trust he had reposed in the respondent, to determine whether the respondent had done what he had been hired
to do, namely, to secure the transaction with a security
interest in both real property and personal property.
The damage did not occur, and the respondent's error
and omission would not be reasonably discoverable, until it
was necessary for the appellant to take some action to execute on his security after his contract buyers filed the
bankruptcy.

If you do not apply such reasoning, then it is

incumbent on all clients to hire a second attorney every
time their initial attorney prepares a contract for them
because, in the usual course of events dealing with contracts that extend over a period of years, the event that
gives rise to a cause of action will not occur until after
-14-

the Statute runs in many contract cases.

The nature of the

relationship of the attorney/client is such that the client
of necessity

reposes great

confidence

and

trust

in his

attorney, and is not likely to seek a second opinion to have
another attorney review the work of the first attorney.
This

court

in Brigham

Young

University

v.

Paulsen

Construction Company, et al., 68 UAR 5 (Utah 1987), had
occasion to discuss the Discovery Rule, but not to apply it
because of the peculiar facts of that case in that BYU knew
of its cause of action against Paulsen for a sufficient
period of time prior to the running of the Statute of Limitations to have commenced their action in a timely fashion,
but consciously elected not to until after the Statute had
run.

The court cited, however, Meyers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d

84, 86 (Utah 1981), where it sanctioned the invocation of
the Discovery Rule when the "application of the general rule
would be irrational or unjust.11
Justice

Howe,

concurred

in

by

The concurring opinion of
Associate

Chief

Justice

Stewart, cited a Federal Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit decision which has application in this case.

In

citing City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corporation, 599 F. 2d 382
(10th Cir.

1979), Justice Howe, noting the case involved a

professional malpractice claim where the Discovery Rule was
applied, stated:
-15-

"*** Logically, I cannot see why if we
applied the Discovery Rule in cases for
professional negligence, the same rule
should not also be applied in cases for
breach of contract where the breach is
a latent defect in the construction which
becomes apparent only after the Statute
of Limitations has otherwise run.*** The
Statute of Limitations does not begin to
run on a negligence claim until the
damage is discovered, which may be after
the limitation on a contract action has
expired."

CONCLDSIONS
The trial court used the wrong date in determining when
the malpractice

occurred

relative

to

the

filing

of

the

U.C.C. 1, and as a matter of law the correct date should
have been May, 1981, and not May, 1976.

This action was

filed in July, 1984, well within the four years allowed by
the Contract Statute of Limitations.
The trial court further erred in the application of the
Occurrence Rule, with the occurrence being the creation of
an inadequate contract in 1976, rather than the application
of the Discovery Rule, or the Damage Rule, which would have
the logical baseline date as to when the Statute commenced
to run as a reasonable time after the filing of the bankruptcy and the appellant's discovery that the respondent had
not filed a U.C.C. 1 renewal in 1981, or secured the obligation of the buyers with an appropriate lien against the real
property.
-16-

The Summary

Judgment

of

the

trial

court

should be

reversed, and the case remanded for a trial on its merits
for

a determination of whether

the respondent

committed

legal malpractice, and the damages that have resulted to the
appellant as a result thereof.
Respectfully submitted this gl ^^

day of February, 1988.

"WENDELL E. BENNETT
Attorney for Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Henry S. Nygaard, attorney for respondent, 333
North 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103, on this J> <~/
day of February, 1988.

j j JL^JUM T. ^L^~M

-17-

